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INTRODUCTION
Following the end of World War II, the new leaders of world politics gathered together
and created the United Nations and subsequent international human rights laws with the goal of
maintaining international peace and stability and eradicating genocide. However, almost a
century later, it is clear that these goals have not been met, as human rights violations continue to
be a pervasive global problem. While scholars diverge on the extent to which they think
international human rights law is implemented and enforced, no scholar argues that international
law sees the routine, effective, and consistent enforcement that would be desirable. The
continued prevalence of human rights abuses and disregard for international human rights law
has resulted in cynicism towards international human rights law as a whole. For example,
Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann described western diplomatic attempts to stop
genocide as “a kind of cynical theater, a pretense of useful activity, a way of disguising a lack of
will… impotent and ridiculous.”1 However, while Zimmermann is correct to condemn the lack
of western action in Yugoslavia, there are times when the international community has taken
strong, decisive actions against human rights abuses.2 Binder names this selective
interventionism the “selectivity gap," in which very similar cases of human rights abuses are
treated very differently by the international community.3 This article will address the selectivity
gap in international responses to human rights crises between 1991 and 2001, with a particular
emphasis on responses from the United States, and argue that political factors such as diplomatic
alignment are important indicators of the likelihood of intervention, alongside traditionally cited
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factors such as economic development and geostrategic concerns. Though we are living in a
period of relative decline in United States power, the conclusions of this article are important for
several reasons. First, the United States still maintains a relatively large influence in the
international system, though certainly not as large as it once was, so US concerns will continue
to have implications for international responses to human rights violations for the time being.
Second, current indicators for the likelihood of intervention can be applied to future international
decision makers, including either new hegemons or groups of powerful states with influence over
humanitarian intervention.
LITERATURE REVIEW
One of the major debates in current international relations scholarship is the extent to
which international human rights law meaningfully influences state behavior. Louis Henkin
argues that “almost all nations observe almost all principals of international law and almost all of
their obligations almost all of the time."4 This assumption that states generally comply with the
international treaties to which they are signatories has been generally accepted in scholarship
pertaining to international law compliance, primarily because of the argument that states are
unlikely to ratify treaties with which they do not intend to comply.5 However, recent
developments in quantitative studies of human rights law compliance find mixed results,
indicating that nondemocratic states often fail to comply with human rights treaties, even after
signing them.6 Thus, recent research has focused on the factors that influence countries’ levels of
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compliance with human rights. Further, recent qualitative studies have concluded that countries
often do not comply with international human rights treaties because of the low likelihood of
incurring costs for noncompliance.7 This raises further questions about what factors determine
the limited number of cases in which the international community does choose to intervene in
situations of human rights violations.
The three major paradigms of international relations diverge in the extent to which they
believe international law can influence state behavior. According to realism, international law
has little hope of influencing the way that states behave, unless it is enforced by a hegemon. As
Danceanu points out, realism asserts that “states are constantly seeking to gain or to maintain
power in order to assert and ensure their own interests."8 As a result, realists argue that
international law merely serves as an instrument for powerful states to assert their self-interests
and will only continue to exist when it serves the interests of dominant states.9 While this may
seem like a grim prospective for human rights compliance, Neumayer argues that the realist
perspective actually bodes well for human rights in the current international system because of
the United States’ relatively positive record of upholding human rights.10 However, powerful
countries rarely devote their resources to enforcing international human rights law, resulting in
an opportunity for states to rhetorically agree to human rights without actually complying in
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order to deflect pressure to respect human rights.11 Still, there are instances in which states do
comply with international law, even when it may not fit their material interests. As a result, while
realism does effectively explain why countries sometimes do not uphold human rights, it lacks
an explanation as to why states sometimes do comply with international law, even when it does
not fit their self-interest.
The liberal institutionalist perspective focuses on international regimes as a way for states
to cooperate in order to gain long-term mutual benefits. According to Hillebrecht, “compliance
with international law [is] a strategy for achieving international cooperation. Compliance with
international law is a way for states to preserve their international reputation… and solve
problems that have no clear domestic solution."12 While they agree with the realist principle that
states follow their own self-interest, institutionalists argue that it is possible for states to
cooperate long-term in order to achieve mutual self-interest. The key enforcement mechanisms
for international law according to institutionalism are reciprocity and reputation, the idea that if
states uphold their commitments then other states will act similarly, resulting in long-term
benefits for all parties.13 While institutionalism would point to a more positive view of the
prospects of international law than realism in most cases, Neumayer argues that it may not be
more positive in the case of human rights because “it is somewhat questionable whether there are
substantial mutual benefits from greater respect for human rights across countries."14 Further,
institutionalism points out that states are unlikely to use sanctions to enforce human rights
because “a sanction will only be credible if the threatening group of countries is better off
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actually executing the sanction than refraining," which is not true in the case of sanctions
regarding noncompliance with human rights treaties.15 Therefore, while liberal institutionalism
may explain how treaties are upheld long term, it is unclear exactly how well this strain of theory
applies to human rights law.
Constructivism asserts that states generally comply with international law as a result of
the socialization process and norms within the international system. According to Danceanu, the
foundation of constructivism is the belief that states “have shared norms shaped by cooperation,
dialogue and inclusiveness."16 For example, according to Simmons, actors will comply with
international law if they are socialized to comply through rewards and punishments as well as
through changing values and identities during the socialization process.17 Similarly, Hawkins
argues that the content of arguments has the greatest influence on the development of
international law and compliance, rather than the power of outside forces as argued by realists.18
He argues that, through the persuasion process, states are able to address their needs and
interests, compromise on the ultimate outcome, and experience social pressure for compliance.
Because the constructivist approach functions under the assumption that states are concerned
about their reputations among other states, international human rights law will be upheld for fear
of being seen as disinterested in human rights.19 While the constructivist approach to human
rights compliance may hold up in some cases, as Hawkins demonstrates, it may fail to explain
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why some states appear relatively unconcerned with their international reputations and remain
outside of the socialization process.
In the last several decades there has been a growth in scholarly interest in settling the
debate regarding the influence of international law on state behavior. According to HafnerBurton and Ron, the first major studies on the impact of human rights law were undertaken in the
1990s and focused on Latin and Central America, which had just undergone major
transformations in the area of human rights.20 Such case studies generally promoted the idea that
international human rights laws could have a positive impact on the global status of human
rights.21 For example, Sikkink’s case studies on Argentina, Mexico, Guatemala, Uruguay, and
Paraguay indicated that local activism against oppressive governments could eventually “shame
Northern governments into policy change."22 Similarly, Danceanu works under the assumption
that “compliance is the normal organizational presumption” in her “Review of the Causes of
Latin American States’ Compliance” and provides these explanations for international law
compliance in Latin America: sanction for non-compliance, ethics, reputation, naming and
shaming, persuasion, membership, capacity, and domestic politics.23 However, these studies
contain the issues which are typically present in qualitative research, such as a lack of
standardization of measures and selection bias.24 While case studies are useful in determining the
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details of individual cases, quantitative research is needed in order to determine the bigger
picture of human rights compliance.
While quantitative research on compliance with international law is challenging because
of the breadth of the field, the multitude of interpretations of compliance, and the lack of data on
compliance, quantitative studies of international law compliance have begun to emerge in the last
several decades, particularly in the field of human rights law. Hafner-Burton, Tsusui, and
Meyer’s study, “International Human Rights Law and the Politics of Legitimation," makes this
argument:
1. The emergence of a global human rights regime in the last several decades has
produced a normative expectation for every state to commit itself to human right
protection; but
2. Reaction to this normative pressure depends on variations in perception and
realities of accountability for non-conformity.25
They argue that, because of the failure to make noncompliance with international human rights
law costly, repressive governments may perceive ratification of human rights treaties as a way to
deflect criticism of their internal practices and improve their international standing without
consequences.26 Therefore, their first hypothesis is that states with records of repression are more
likely to commit to human rights regimes than those with no records of repression.27 Second,
they hypothesize that repressive governments with greater autonomy from domestic oppositions
are more likely to commit to human rights regimes than those with less autonomy.28 Using data
from the US State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and Amnesty
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International, they confirm both hypotheses and, further, find that “the decoupling between
policy and practice is more radical than [they] had imagined," indicating that repressive states
often join human rights regimes without the intention of complying.29
Neumayer’s study “Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human
Rights?” similarly attempts to quantify the extent to which international human rights law
improves respect for human rights in ratifying countries. The study uses data from the two
Purdue Political Terror Scales, which codify information from the U.S. Department of State’s
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and from Amnesty International reports, and
compares countries’ levels of human rights compliance to their levels of treaty ratification.30
Neumayer uses similar control variables to Hathaway, including a measure of the extent of
external and internal armed conflict, the Polity measure of political democracy, per capita
income, population size, and the number of international NGOS with domestic participation.31
Neumayer’s findings show that “the beneficial effect of ratification… is typically conditional on
the extent of democracy and the strength of civil society groups," meaning that treaty ratification
is likely to have a positive effect on respect for human rights in democratic countries, but a
negative impact on human rights in the absence of democratic civil society.32
A similar study by Hathaway attempts to quantify international human rights law
compliance using various data sets on genocide, torture, fair trial, civil liberty, and women’s
political equality.33 In the first portion of the quantitative analysis, she studies the relationship
between treaty ratification and country ratings and finds that countries that have ratified human
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rights treaties generally have better human rights ratings than those who have not.34 However,
while countries that have ratified human rights treaties do have higher ratings on average, she
finds evidence that countries with poor human rights ratings are sometimes more likely to have
ratified relevant human rights treaties.35 Overall, her findings contradict the common claim that
compliance with treaties is the norm.36 Next, Hathaway attempts to measure whether countries
that have ratified treaties are more likely to conform to the requirements of the treaty. She draws
on previous research to select these control variables: international war, civil war, population
size, population growth, and the age of the regime in power.37 The results indicate that treaty
ratification is actually often associated with worse human rights practices than otherwise
expected.38 Hathaway concludes that external pressure encourages states to ratify human rights
treaties, but the lack of monitoring and enforcement of human rights treaties means there is little
incentive for ratifying states to make the costly policy changes it would take to uphold human
rights law.39
The findings of Hathaway’s study and similar studies indicate that states resistant to
human rights compliance are not likely to comply with international human rights law unless the
costs of noncompliance are greater than the costs of compliance. This finding raises the question
as to in what situations will other countries raise the costs of noncompliance in order to induce
compliance. Choi’s study “What Determines US Humanitarian Intervention?” focuses on
competing explanations for US humanitarian intervention. According to Choi, realists argue that
the decision to intervene is based on national interests, such as “securing the supply of oil or
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expanding power interests."40 Choi tests this argument using indicators of national interest
including oil exports, alliances, and geographical proximity.41 Conversely, liberals argue that
humanitarian interventions are “a manifestation of America’s moral obligations and
responsibilities as a world leader."42 Choi tests this argument using the level of human rights
violations in a given country, assuming that, if the liberal argument is correct, the US should be
more likely to intervene in places with worse rights violations.43 Based on his research, Choi
determines that US interventions are generally better explained by the level of violence in a
given country than US national security interests, indicating that liberalism is a better theory for
explaining humanitarian intervention.44
A similar study by Yoon attempts to quantify reasons for US intervention in Third World
internal wars following the end of World War II. Yoon tests realist variables, including
intervention by the Soviet Union, communism, strategic importance to the United States, and
geographical proximity, as well as economic variables including US dependence on raw
material, the importance of the market to the US, and US foreign investment.45 Yoon finds little
evidence for the economic explanations of US intervention, but finds that the realist explanations
do have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of US intervention. Conversely,
Fordham’s study, “Power or Plenty? Economic Interests, Security Concerns, and American
Intervention” argues that studies such as Yoon’s which do not find evidence of economic impact
fail to consider the indirect effects of US economic interests, such as the long-term impact of
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economic concerns on US alliance making.46 Fordham tests security interests, including the
presence of allies and the presence of rivals, and economic interests, measured by foreign direct
investment, and determines that the initial test confirms Yoon’s idea that security concerns are
more influential than economic concerns on US foreign policy.47 However, he demonstrates
through further tests that alliances are often formed based on economic considerations, indicating
that economic factors do have an indirect effect on US foreign policy.48 Overall, these two
studies indicate that security concerns have a more immediate effect on US intervention, but that
economic concerns are indirectly involved.
Previous quantitative research regarding international law enforcement leaves open a gap
regarding what factors influence military intervention into human rights violations. Choi and
Yoon successfully demonstrate the importance of security concerns in determining US decisions
to intervene. However, as Fordham points out, the importance of economic factors may be
undervalued by previous researchers, including Choi and Yoon. This article will thus treat
economic variables as indicators of humanitarian intervention that require further exploration.
Further, previous scholars consider political explanations of humanitarian intervention such as
alliance politics, but fail to consider the way diplomatic relationships outside of security alliances
impact the likelihood of intervention. This is surprising given that political interests have a large
impact on state behavior. Therefore, this study will focus on diplomatic alignment as a second
indicator of humanitarian intervention.
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
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This article will focus primarily on US-sponsored humanitarian interventions for two
reasons. First, there is a large breadth of data available regarding US relationships with other
countries as well as US motivations. Second, many scholars essentially argue that US decisions
and global decisions are interchangeable because of the predominance of US policy, particularly
following the Cold War at the height of US hegemony. For example, Stoll argues that “the
United States largely initiated and contributed to today’s international legal system, and can still
be considered to have an enormous and exceptional potential in terms of military and economic
power."49 Similarly, Labonte points out that
[The United States] plays a highly important role in shaping international policy
concerning responses to mass atrocities, including humanitarian intervention. Moreover,
without US support it would be extremely difficult (possibly impractical) for the Security
Council or a coalition of the willing to sanction the use of force to halt or prevent mass
atrocities, including cases that today would be classified as R2P cases. In other words, the
international community of states will not be persuaded to take robust action in halting
mass atrocities if Washington is not persuaded.50
As these two scholars indicate, it is largely accepted that the United States has a large influence
over international decision making, particularly immediately following the Cold War. This
makes it possible to use US decision making as an indicator of international decision making.
However, this is not to say that the US is able to enforce its preferences unchallenged within the
international system. As Bearsdley finds, although the interests of the US and the other members
of the P-5 are important determinants of UN action, the organizational mission of the UN is also
a powerful influence on humanitarian intervention.51 However, for the convenience of this study,
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United States foreign policy will be treated as a reasonable indicator of the likelihood of
international humanitarian intervention.
I provide three hypotheses for the quantitative portion of this study. The first hypothesis
focuses on diplomatic proximity as measured by voting habits within the United Nations:
Hypothesis 1: The United States will be less likely to intervene in personal integrity
violations in countries with more similar voting patterns in the United Nations.
As Akhavan argues, “whether military action is taken in a given situation is determined by the
political interests at stake.”52 While the political will is certainly influenced by geostrategic
interests, as previous scholars argue, I argue that it is additionally influenced by diplomatic
alignment. For example, I would expect the United States to be less willing to intervene in
human rights violations in a country with which it had strong diplomatic ties because it would be
unwilling to destabilize a relationship with a potential ally or trading partner. Therefore, I argue
that the United States will be less likely to intervene in countries with more similar voting
patterns in the United Nations.
The second hypothesis focuses on democracy as an indicator of intervention:
Hypothesis 2: The United States will be more likely to intervene in personal integrity
violations in countries with medium to high levels of democratization.
I argue that the United States will be more likely to intervene in countries with higher levels of
democratization because human rights violations in democracies represent more of a threat to the
international order. This view is confirmed by Choi, who argues that “when the United States
employs its military abroad to protect human rights, it also aims at advancing or defending
democracy as a system of government."53 Additionally, the United States is more likely to be
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willing to intervene in an established democracy than in an authoritarian state with the potential
to require nation building by the United States. However, as Paranti argues, the United States is
not always as concerned with democracy as it may claim to be. For example, during the Cold
War, the United States habitually favored authoritarian regimes over democratically elected
communist governments in Latin America.54 Consequently, it is plausible that there will not be a
relationship between democracy and intervention.
The third hypothesis focuses on economic indicators of intervention:
Hypothesis 3: The United States will be less likely to intervene in personal integrity
violations in countries with more integrated economies.
I argue that the United States will be less likely to intervene in personal integrity violations in
countries with which it shares greater levels of trade because it will not want to disrupt the trade
flow. For example, assuming that the United States would use diplomatic strategies such as
economic sanctions before beginning a military intervention, US leaders could expect significant
backlash over disrupted trade with important trading partners. However, it is also possible that
the relationship will go the other way because the US may want to protect the trade flow from
the kind of disruption caused by humanitarian crises. Overall, I expect economic factors to be an
important indicator for the likelihood to intervene because of the importance of economic factors
in political decision making.
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Diplomatic proximity with the United States is measured by the ideal point estimates
from Voeten, Strezhnev, and Bailey’s “United Nations General Assembly Voting Data."55 The
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UN General Assembly Voting data set contains data on roll-call votes in the UN General
Assembly from 1946 through 2020. This data is translated into ideal point estimates based on
voting patterns as described in “Estimating Dynamic States Preferences from United Nations
Voting Data."56 The ideal point distance has become the standard data source for constructing
measures of states preferences because it contains concrete, measurable actions from most
countries over a long period of time.57 The ideal point distance is used in this study as a measure
of diplomatic alignment with the United States using data on relationships between the United
States and all countries included from 1991 to 2001.
Levels of democratization are measured by the Polity Score which provides scores from 10 for full autocracy to +10 for full democracy.58 Choi uses the polity score as a measure of
democracy in his study of what determines US humanitarian intervention, as does Fordham in
his analysis of the effects of political and economic interests on intervention.59 Polity 2 data from
1991 to 2001 is used for this study. Polity 2 is chosen over Polity 1 because it has less missing
data for the time period in consideration.
Economic integration with the United States is measured through trade balance, exports
and imports, US foreign direct investment, gross domestic product, and fuel exports as a
percentage of merchandise exports. Yoon uses foreign direct investment and trade as measures of
US economic interests, while Fordham uses only foreign direct investment.60 I use both foreign
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direct investment and exports measured in US dollars.61 I additionally add gross domestic
product as a measure of the size of the economy, assuming that the US will be more concerned
with countries with larger economies.62 In addition, I add a measure of US fuel reliance.
Beardsley argues that oil reliance is a top long term security concern in the United States, so
issues involving oil exporters will draw particular attention.63 I operationalize this argument
using World Bank data on oil exports as a percentage of merchandise exports.64
RESPONSE VARIABLES
The response variable measured in this research is US intervention in cases of human
rights violations. I include measures for personal integrity violations and humanitarian
intervention as separate response variables in order to obtain the most data. Personal integrity
rights violations “include the right to life and the inviolability of the human person. Violations of
personal integrity rights include prolonged and arbitrary detention, extrajudicial killing, torture,
genocide, and other severe violations of bodily integrity.”65 For the purpose of this research, the
data on violations of personal integrity rights will be used to explore the relationship between the
United States and countries with high levels of rights violations. This data is valuable to
measurements of intervention as long as we assume that high levels of rights violations will
cease following US intervention. This data comes from two primary data sets: the Political
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Terror Scale, which gives a rating of one through five, with five being the highest possible
amount of government inflicted terror, and the CIRI human rights data, which gives a rating of
zero through eight, eight being the highest level of respect for human rights.66 Second, there is a
limited amount of data on humanitarian intervention. I include the Kisangani and Pickering
dataset on international military intervention which provides data on various types of
intervention. I include only cases which the dataset lists as humanitarian intervention. I add a
score of one for US involvement and zero for no US involvement as a second variable.67 I use a
linear regression to find the relationship between each of the response variables, shown across
the top row of Table 1, with each explanatory variable, shown in the first column in Table 1.
RESULTS
Table 1: Multiple Regression Results
Political Terror
Scale (State
Department)

Political Terror
Scale (Amnesty
International)

Cingranelli and
Richards Human
Rights Dataset

Kisangani and
Pickering
International
Military
Intervention
Dataset

Kisangani and
Pickering
International
Military
Intervention
Dataset (US
Involved)

Polity 2

-0.017*

-0.015*

0.043**

-0.003**

-0.003**

Voeten Ideal
Point Distance

0.545**

0.469**

-1.221**

-0.019**

-0.021**

Exports (US$
Thousand)

-8.939E-10

-1.436E-9

-1.912E-9

-5.331E-11

1.509E-11

US Foreign
Direct
Investment

-1.238E-6

-1.864E-6

7.059E-7

-2.728E-7

-2.826E-7

Gross Domestic
Product

3.667E-14

4.305E-14

-1.422E-13

-5.445E-15

-4.329E-16
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Oil Exports as a
Percentage of
Merchandise
Exports

-0.001

0.001

0.003

0.001**

0.001**

Adj. R²

0.241

0.194

0.311

0.029

0.029

N

956

813

900

963

963

*Significant at the .05 level
**Significant at the .01 level

The results of the multiple regression are reported in Table 1. The first hypothesis
predicts that the Voeten ideal point distance should have a positive relationship with the Political
Terror Scale, assuming that higher levels of intervention correlate with lower levels of human
rights violations. Because the Cingranelli and Richards data is coded so that eight is the lowest
level of human rights violations, the Voeten ideal point distance should have a negative
relationship with the CIRI data in order to indicate the same relationship. The results confirm
that the Voeten ideal point distance has a statistically significant positive relationship with both
sets of Political Terror Scale data and a negative relationship with the CIRI data. Additionally,
the Voeten ideal point distance should have a negative relationship with the Kisangani and
Pickering International Military Intervention Dataset. The results confirm a statistically
significant negative relationship between the Voeten ideal point distance and the Kisangani and
Pickering data, both with and without US involvement.
The second hypothesis predicts that the Polity Score should have a positive relationship
with the Cingranelli and Richards data and a negative relationship with the Political Terror Scale
data. The results confirm that there is a statistically significant negative relationship between the
Polity Score and both sets of Political Terror Scale data, as well as a statistically significant
positive relationship between the Polity Score and the CIRI human rights data. We would expect
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this kind of correlation because the Polity Score takes human rights violations into account as
part of its system of measuring democracy. Additionally, the hypothesis predicts that there
should be a positive relationship between the Polity Score and the military intervention
indicators. The results show a statistically significant negative relationship between the Polity
Score and the Kisangani and Pickering international military intervention dataset, indicating that
there may actually be a negative relationship between Polity and likelihood of intervention.
The third hypothesis predicts that there should be a positive relationship between all
indicators of economic integration and the Political Terror Scale data given the argument that
higher levels of economic integration will result in a lower likelihood of intervention, assuming
that lower levels of intervention mean higher levels of rights violations. Similarly, the hypothesis
predicts a negative relationship between the economic indicators and the Cingranelli and
Richards human rights data, which would indicate that higher levels of economic integration
resulted in higher levels of rights violations. None of the economic indicators have statistically
significant relationships with either the Political Terror Scale data or the CIRI human rights data.
Additionally, there should be a negative relationship between the economic indicators and the
military intervention data sets. However, there is a statistically significant positive relationship
between oil exports as a percentage of merchandise exports and the Kisangani and Pickering
international military intervention data, both with and without US involvement. I ran additional
regressions using either exports or GDP as indicators rather than combining them to ensure that
the data was not losing significance due to collinearity, but did not find this to be the case. None
of the other economic indicators have statistically significant relationships with either set of
military intervention data. I additionally include a logit regression in order to better test the
relationship between the explanatory variables and the dichotomous military intervention data.
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Table 2: Logit Regression Results

Kisangani and Pickering
International Military Intervention
Dataset

Kisangani and Pickering
International Military Intervention
Dataset (US Involved)

Polity 2

-0.086*

-0.096

Voeten Ideal Point Distance

-0.918**

-1.584**

Exports (US$ Thousand)

1.109E-7

1.629E-6**

US Foreign Direct Investment

-0.001

-0.001**

Gross Domestic Product

-8.989E-12

-1.651E-11

Oil Exports as a Percentage of
Merchandise Exports

0.019**

0.0290**

N

962

962

*Significant at the .05 level
**Significant at the .01 level

The first hypothesis would predict a negative relationship between Voeten ideal point
distance and the Kisangani and Pickering Military Intervention dataset. As shown in Table 2, the
data from the logit regression confirms that there is a statistically significant negative
relationship between the Voeten ideal point distance and the Kisangani and Pickering data, both
with and without US involvement. Notably, the relationship is stronger with US involvement
than without, which provides further evidence that US involvement is a key facet of the
relationship between diplomatic alignment and intervention.
The second hypothesis would predict a positive relationship between the Polity Score and
the international military intervention data. However, the data indicates that there is a statistically
significant negative relationship between the Polity Score and military intervention. While this
would suggest that the United States is less likely to intervene in countries with medium to high
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levels of democratization, it is more likely a result of spuriousness in the data. The Polity Score
uses human rights violations as a measure of polity, so countries with higher polity scores are
guaranteed to have lower levels of human rights violations. This would indicate that there would
be no need for humanitarian intervention, so the relationship found by the logit regression is
likely spurious. There is no statistically significant relationship between the Polity Score and USsponsored intervention, though this may be a result of the lack of data for US-sponsored
intervention rather than an indicator of a lack of relationship between the two variables.
The third hypothesis would predict a negative relationship between Voeten ideal point
distance and the Kisangani and Pickering Military Intervention dataset. The data confirms a
statistically significant negative relationship between US Foreign Direct Investment and the
Kisangani and Pickering intervention data. However, the data finds a statistically significant
positive relationship between exports and US-sponsored intervention, as well as a statistically
significant relationship between oil exports as a percentage of merchandise exports and the
international military intervention dataset, both with and without US involvement.
DISCUSSION
Hypothesis one states that the United States will be less likely to intervene in personal
integrity violations in countries with more similar voting patterns in the United Nations. The
results of the multiple regression indicate that there is a statistically significant positive
relationship between the Voeten ideal point distance and the Political Terror Scale. Since the
Political Terror Scale data is coded from one to five, one being the lowest levels of rights
violations and five being the highest, the data indicates that countries with more similar voting
records to the United States will be more likely to have high levels of domestic rights violations.
The results also show a statistically significant negative relationship between the Voeten ideal
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point distance and the Cingranelli-Richards human rights data set. Since the CIRI dataset is
coded from zero to eight, with zero being the least respect for human rights and eight being the
most respect for human rights, this indicates that countries with closer diplomatic relationships
with the United States will be less likely to have high levels of respect for human rights.
Assuming that international intervention into rights violations will result in lower levels of rights
violations over time, I make the argument based on this data that the United States is less likely
to intervene in human rights violations in countries that diplomatically align themselves with the
United States, meaning that the hypothesis is correct. However, it is also possible that this
relationship is influenced by the relationship between democracy and rights violations.
Respecting human rights is part of being classified as a democracy, and democracies are likely to
have similar voting patterns to the United States. Therefore, it may actually be that countries that
diplomatically align themselves with the United States are unlikely to commit rights violations,
rather than that the United States is less likely to intervene.
The Voeten ideal point distance is additionally tested with data on intervention. Again,
the results indicate a statistically significant negative relationship between the Voeten ideal point
distance and the Kisangani and Pickering international military intervention data, both in
interventions when the US is involved and when it is not. This confirms the previous assertion
that the United States is less likely to intervene in human rights violations in countries that are
more closely diplomatically aligned with the United States.
Hypothesis two states that the United States will be more likely to intervene in personal
integrity violations in countries with higher levels of democratization. The hypothesis correctly
predicts that the Polity score has a statistically significant negative relationship with the Political
Terror Scores both from the States Department and from Amnesty International. This indicates
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that lower levels of democracy are associated with higher levels of state sponsored terror.
Similarly, the Polity score has a statistically significant positive relationship with the Cingranelli
and Richards human rights index, indicating that higher levels of democracy correspond with
higher levels of respect for human rights. However, it is likely that these results are due to the
relationship between high levels of democracy and high levels of human rights rather than
international enforcement. In fact, the results from both the regression and the logit regression
indicate that there is a negative relationship between the Polity score and the Kisangani and
Pickering international intervention data. This suggests that the United States is actually less
likely to intervene in human rights violations in countries with high levels of democracy. While
it is likely that the United States would not want to intervene in a highly democratic country with
which it would likely have a strong diplomatic relationship, it is also possible that these results
merely reflect the lessened likelihood of human rights violations in highly democratic countries
rather than a negative relationship between democracy and intervention.
Hypothesis three states that the United States will be less likely to intervene in personal
integrity violations in countries with more integrated economies. The regression results indicate
this to be false, but only find a statistically significant relationship with one variable, oil exports
as a percentage as merchandise exports, which has a positive relationship with the Kisangani and
Pickering intervention data. These findings differ from Choi, who does not find a statistically
significant relationship between intervention and his oil supply variable.68 This is likely a result
of the fact that Choi uses a dummy variable for oil exporting countries, while I use oil exports as
a percentage of merchandise exports. This allows me to measure changes to the relationship
between intervention and smaller and larger amounts of oil exports, rather than oil exports as a
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whole. As a result, it appears that the United States is more concerned with countries that export
large amounts of oil. The logit regression finds more statistically significant relationships
between economic indicators and the Kisangani and Pickering intervention data. It suggests that
intervention by the United States is more likely in countries with high levels of exports to the
United States. Similarly, both international and US-sponsored intervention are more likely in
countries with high percentages of oil as a percentage of merchandise exports. However, it finds
that US-sponsored intervention is less likely in countries with high levels of US foreign direct
investment. Overall, it does appear to confirm the hypothesis that the United States is more likely
to intervene in countries with highly-integrated economies, though this conclusion is confounded
slightly by the negative relationship between US foreign direct investment and US-sponsored
intervention.
Given the high level of concern for the economy within the US government, it is
somewhat surprising that so few of the economic variables turn out to have a statistically
significant relationship with US intervention. These findings are corroborated by previous
scholars. For example, Choi initially argues that, because developed countries have fewer people
living below the poverty line, people in developed countries will be less prone to violence and
their governments will have more resources to deal with violence.69 This indicates that the
United States should be more prone to intervene in countries with low levels of economic
development. However, similar to my findings, Choi does not find a statistically significant
relationship between economic development and intervention. Fordham also does not find a
statistically significant relationship between intervention and his economic indicators.70
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However, Fordham does find evidence that trade has influenced who the United States forms
alliances with.71 This suggests that security concerns measured by alliances have an immediate
influence on intervention, but economic interests have a long term impact on intervention.72 In
regards to my data, this suggests that, while economic variables may not have the kind of
immediate impact that would show up in this study, they likely play a long term role in shaping
other variables which do have short term effects, such as diplomatic alignment.
This study contains several potential sources of spuriousness. First, Beardsley
demonstrates in his study of the determinants of UN involvement in international crises that
decisions to intervene by the UN are influenced more heavily by the general desire to uphold the
UN Charter than by the desires of individual P5 members.73 Similarly, Scott argues that
“international law is more than simply a blank slate onto which the most powerful can translate
their policy desires," suggesting that the United States does not have full, unchallenged control
over decisions made within the international system.74 Thus, it is possible that this study
overvalues the amount of US influence on international decisions to intervene, particularly in
instances of UN-sponsored intervention. Second, as Binder demonstrates, none of the
humanitarian crises between 1991 and 2004 went completely unaddressed; some kind of
international response, usually in the form of humanitarian aid, was always present.75 This
indicates that by focusing on military intervention this study may overlook other types of
responses to human rights crises. Finally, the relationship between political proximity to the US

71

Fordham, Benjamin O. "Power or Plenty? Economic Interests, Security Concerns, and American Intervention":
751.
72
Fordham, Benjamin O. "Power or Plenty? Economic Interests, Security Concerns, and American Intervention":
754.
73
Beardsley, Kyle, and Schmidt, Holger. "Following the Flag or Following the Charter? Examining the
Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-2002”: 33-49.
74
Byers, Michael, and Nolte, Georg. “Compliance”: 449-450.
75
Binder, Martin. "Humanitarian Crises and the International Politics of Selectivity": 343.

26
and likelihood of intervention may be influenced by democracy for two reasons. First, it is
reasonable to assume that democratic countries will tend to have a high level of diplomatic
alignment with the United States. Since diplomatic countries tend to have higher levels of respect
for rights, this is a possible source of endogeneity. Second, as Dancenau points out, states
seeking international recognition may view respecting human rights as a means to that end.76
Countries which are seeking approval of the United States may choose both to respect human
rights and vote in line with the US in the United Nations, thus providing another potential source
of endogeneity.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the results of this study indicate that the likelihood of intervention has a
statistically significant relationship with both measures of democracy and measures of
diplomatic alignment. In regards to the debate between the optimistic view and the skeptical
view of international human rights law, I would argue that these results lend themselves more to
the skeptical view. According to the optimistic view, substantial changes occurred following the
end of the Cold War, including the “emerging norm of justified intervention” into human rights
crises and an increased focus on “human security” within the Security Council.77 This diverges
from the more skeptical view of international human rights law which argues that material forces
dictate state behavior, rather than norms regarding human rights.78 This view emphasises the
inconsistencies in international responses to human rights which are clearly present in my data.
For example, my data indicates that in instances of human rights violations, the choice to
intervene is influenced by political considerations and likely also economic considerations to
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some extent. While Choi proves that the level of violence involved in human rights violations
does have a significant influence on the decision to intervene, it is still the case that cases where
there was no intervention into countries violating human rights may have occurred because of
political or economic concerns, rather than humanitarian reasoning.79 Overall, it appears that the
United State’s decisions to intervene are influenced by political considerations, resulting in the
aforementioned selectivity gap and discrepancies in international responses to human rights
violations.
The data from this study additionally has implications for the strain of research which
focuses on the growing trend of countries ratifying human rights law without any apparent
intention of compliance. As Hafner-Burton argues,
This failure to make non-compliance costly is both wide-spread around the world and
observable; states witness only the most limited repercussions of violations of human
rights treaties and, over time, have learned that nonconformity is relatively inexpensive.
Repressive governments accordingly are likely to perceive ratification of human rights
treaties as an easy way to deflect criticism about their domestic violations and improve
their standing in the international community.80
According to this argument, repressive states will frequently ratify human rights treaties to obtain
the diplomatic legitimization that comes along with treaty ratification, but will not actually
implement the treaties because the costs of implementing the treaties are higher than the costs of
failing to do so. Neumayer adds to this argument that the implementation of treaties is more
likely in democracies as well as autocracies with strong civil societies, but unlikely in
autocracies with no civil society, which have the ability to fail to implement treaties with little
domestic backlash.81 Based on the data from this study, I would additionally expect to see that
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countries’ abilities to ratify treaties that they do not expect to implement are influenced by their
relationships with the United States. For example, a country that aligns itself closely with the
United States might be more likely to get away with this kind of behavior than one which already
has a tumultuous relationship with the US. Thus, Hafner-Burton and Neumayer’s studies may
benefit from the consideration of external factors that can influence international law
enforcement as well as their included internal indicators of compliance. Overall, I argue that the
realist argument that states will only comply with international law when it is enforced by a
hegemon is correct, though democracies do appear to be an exception to this rule.
Nondemocracies appear to ratify international human rights law in order to gain a boost in their
international reputations and will only actually uphold international law if it is enforced by the
hegemon or the international community as a whole, as realists argue.
Finally, the data from this study highlights a few potential areas for future study. First,
this study relies on the assumption that the United States has a significant effect on international
decisions to intervene. In order for this assumption to be accurate, I focus on a time period in
which the United States was a clear hegemon. However, as the international system shifts away
from US hegemony, I would expect to see its priorities shift away from predominant US
interests, meaning that intervention may no longer be so strongly influenced by US political and
economic concerns. Future research might focus on less US-centric indicators of intervention.
Second, as Binder argues, military intervention is not the only meaningful international response
to human rights crises.82 Future research might attempt to discern whether the indicators used in
this study have significant relationships with alternative responses to human rights crises.
Finally, much of the research surrounding the influence of politics and polity on responses to
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human rights crises assumes that democracies will be more likely to respond to human rights
violations because of domestic backlash. Future research might focus on the influence of the
media in determining the level of international response to human rights crises.
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